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The New African Diaspora: Engaging the Question of Brain
Drain-Brain Gain2
Akanmu G. Adebayo
The literature on the New African Diaspora is growing. One of the latest is the
volume co-edited by Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu,3 published by
Indiana University Press in 2009. A common thread in the literature is the
identification of the "brain drain" as a major consequence of the establishment
of the ew African Diaspora. Another common postulation is that the "brain
drain" can be turned into "brain gain" through the concerted efforts of African
governments, international organizations, and members of the disapora
themselves. This paper interrogates popular and intellectual assumptions about
diaspora, brain drain, and brain gain. The paper is divided into four parts. The
first reviews the literature and data on the New African Diaspora; the second
analyzes the brain drain and its effects on and implications for Africa's
development; the third evaluates the brain gain hypothesis; and the final part
introduces a few recommendations to transform brain drain to brain gain.
Introduction: The Literature on the New African Diaspora
Who/what is the African Diaspora? The African Union (AU) defines the
African Diaspora as "peoples of African origin living outside the continent,
irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute
to the development of the continent and the bUilding of the African Union" (The
African Union, YEAR, p. ). Based on this definition and on the estimated
numbers of people of African descent in Europe (3.51 million), North America
(39.16 million), Latin America (112.65 million), and the Caribbean (13.56
million), the AU categorized the African Diaspora as constituting the "sixth
region" of Africa (Auma, 2009).
The AU's definition takes ordinary sojourn-"living outside the
continent"-for diaspora. It takes as diaspora all Africans abroad, "even when the
2This paper was first presented at the Global Conference of Black Nationalities, "The Black Race:
The Past, Present and Future" at Osogbo, Osun State, Nigeria, August 23-27, 2010.
30kpewho,1. & Nzegwu, N. (Eds.). (2009). The New African Diaspora. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
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communities concerned may not think of themselves in diasporic terms" (Zeleza,
2009, p. 33). Although diaspora begins with migration or dispersal, this alone is
not sufficient. According to Paul Zeleza, Diaspora is as much a process as it is a
product (2009, pp. 32-33). Colin Palmer takes a more complex look at diaspora
and defines it as follows:
The modern African diaspora, at its core, consists of the millions of peoples of
African descent living in various societies who are united by a past based
significantly but not exclusively upon "racial" oppression and the struggles
against it and who, despite the cultural variations and political and other
divisions among them, share an emotional bond with one another and with
their ancestral continent and who also, regardless of their location, face broadly
similar problems in constructing and realizing themselves. (Palmer, 2000, pp.
27-32)
Palmer further indicates that the African Diaspora was a product of at least
five, maybe more, migratory drifts which he calls "diasporic streams." These
include:
a. prehistoric migrations out of Africa about 100,000 years ago;
b. migration of Bantu-speaking peoples from the region of Cross River in
Nigeria through Central Africa into the Indian Ocean littoral about 3,000
BCE;
c. trading diasporas created by African merchants, slaves, and soldiers in
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia from about the fifth century BCE,
whose major component was the increased migration occasioned by Islam
in Arabia in the seventh century CE;
d. the Atlantic Slave Trade to the Americas and Europe; and
e. the contemporary migration streams which began after the end of slavery
and picked up steam in the colonial and post-colonial periods.
It was these disaporic streams, Palmer stresses, "together with the
communities that they constructed that form a disapora" (Palmer, 2000, p. 28).
Both the AU's and Palmer's approaches to the Diaspora are broad and historical,
as they should be. This paper focuses on the New African Diaspora-i.e., the one
created after independence, fostered by globalization, and especially fueled by
various economic, political, and social forces within Africa in the 1990s.
There is no consensus yet on how to characterize the ew African Diaspora.
Various scholars use different markers to differentiate it from the "older" African
Diaspora. According to Okpewho, Ali Mazrui calls the older diaspora the
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"diaspora of enslavement" and the new African Diaspora the "diaspora of
imperialism." By the same token, the older diaspora may be viewed as the
disapora of forced migration while the new may be considered as the Diaspora of
voluntary migration. one of these characterizations is without flaws or
limitations. This paper borrows Okpewho's characterization of the older diaspora
as "precolonial" and the new diaspora as "postcolonial" (Okepewho, 2009, p. 5).
Assumed, but often lost or unexplained, in these characterizations is the
question: who is an African? This question is important especially in the context
of the New African Diaspora and in order to identify, track, and mobilize
Africans in the Diaspora for the development of the continent. Paul Zeleza
attempts to tackle this question in the study referred to earlier. In his view,
"African is as much a reality as it is a construct" (Zeleza, 2009, pp. 33-34). It is a
geographical reality, but much of that geography is ideologically and racially
constructed. In fact, the name Africa is not African at all; it was of Roman origin
and it referred to the Roman province of North Africa around present-day
Tunisia. Over time, especially since the Portuguese voyages of exploration in the
15th century, the name was expanded to entail all of the continent and adjacent
islands; but this was to change in the 19th and 20th centuries when, as a result of
racist theorizing, North Africa was dissected from sub-Saharan Africa, the latter
being regarded as "Africa proper." This enabled Eurocentric scholars to deny as
"African" the achievements of such major centers of civilizations as Egypt,
Carthage, Islamic North Africa, and even the stone buildings of Zimbabwe. The
dissection leaves many in contemporary times wondering if an Egyptian, a
Tunisian,4 or a white South African immigrant to the United States qualifies to be
called "African American." In essence, African and Africanness must be
considered in terms of multiple identities, which may be based on geographical,
racial, or transnational factors. The African Union takes this multidimensional,
multifaceted approach.
Now, let's do the numbers. For various reasons, population, immigration,
naturalization, labor, and other demographic information in the United States
are open to gross undercounting. Most censuses usually focus on citizens rather
than illegal immigrants. Official figures do indicate that the number of recent
4 This is ironic. The name "Africa" originally applied to the region of Tunisia. However, as a result
of historical and demographic changes, Tunisia has been Arabized and the country served, for a
time, as the headquarters of the Arab League.
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migrants from Africa has been steadily rising. Estimates of Africa-born persons
in the United States from 2006 to 2008 are presented in Table 1. The data show
an increase from approximately 1.38 million in 2006 to 1.42 million in 2007, and
1.44 million in 2008. The table also confirms that a consistently high proportion
of these immigrants came from Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia.
Other indicators of this immigrant population are presented in Tables 2-5.
Table 2 shows the number of Africa-born persons naturalized in the United
States between 2000 and 2009. This number increased from 25,792 in 2000 to
60,383 in 2009. Again, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Egypt had the biggest numbers.
Table 3 reveals a similar trend. With minor fluctuations, the number of Africans
who secured permanent resident status (a.k.a. Green Card) almost tripled from
44,534 in 2000 to 127,050 in 2009. Ethiopia has a slight edge over Nigeria,
followed closely by Kenya, Egypt, and Ghana in 2009. Table 4 reveals much about
the pipeline: a visit might create the opportunity to stay permanently, and legal
permanent residence might lead to naturalization in five years. Whereas there
were more visits by South Africans than Nigerians, fewer South Africans than
Nigerians proceeded to permanent residence status. Still, visits from Nigeria rank
high despite the tales of visa denials. In 2009, there were almost half a million
visits from Africa, with 107,238 from South Africa and 88,473 from Nigeria.
While the number of emigrants was quite high and significant for Africa as a
whole as well as for individual countries, it represents only a small slice of the pie.
The evidence for this can be seen in the following charts. Figure 1 shows the
relative importance of immigrant labor in the U.S. economy. The share of
immigrants in the U.S. population increased three-fold from 5.3% in 1970 to
15.7% in 2008. In the same period, the proportion of immigrants in the civilian
labor force almost tripled from 4.8% in 1970 to 12.5% in 2008. Despite these, the
proportion of African immigrants was very small indeed. Figure 2 is a pie chart
showing the top ten countries of immigration to the United States in 2008. No
African country was on that chart. Figure 3 is a histogram and it shows vividly
the percentage distribution of immigrants by region of origin. Africa consistently
had a small share, from 0.2 million in 1980 to 0.4 million in 1990,0.9 million in
2000, and rising finally to 1.4 million in 2008. A similar trend is shown in the new
millennium. Table 5, for instance, shows the number of persons naturalized by
world region. Africa represents a small but increasing part of the total: rising
from 25,792 in 2000 to 60,383 in 2009.
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As we have indicated above, the ew African Diaspora is the result of these
migratory streams. At this point in the paper, we can ask a few questions. What
were the main reasons for emigration out of Africa? What has been the pattern of
settlement in the United States and with what degree of success have migrants
integrated into the host society? What were the impacts and implications of
emigration for Africa? In particular, what is brain drain and how has it affected
Africa?
Let's address the reasons for emigrations first. One major reason for
emigration is political instability that engulfed many African countries shortly
after independence. Refugees from civil wars, or displaced persons from political
thuggery, military coups and assassinations, and religious violence were offered
asylum in many Western nations. In fact, refugees from the Nigerian Civil War
were among the earliest Nigerian immigrants in the United States and many of
them still identified themselves-sometimes jokingly, sometimes seriously-as
Biafrans. Thousands of immigrants from Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan,
Liberia, DR Congo, etc. have been admitted to the United States and offered
asylum. Similarly, thousands of Nigerians fled the country in the dark days of the
Babangida/Abacha dictatorship.
In addition to political crises, economic and social factors also contributed
to the emigration from Africa. According to Amadu Kaba, in the last two decades
many sought migration as a result of "low salaries," "frustrated career goals,"
"lack of quality of life, high levels of crime, social pressure," and "poor social
services" (Kaba, 2009, pp. 115-119). Individuals have their reasons but altogether
these have been the accepted push-and-pull factors, which have also been called
endogenous and exogenous factors (Oberoi & Lin, 2006, p. 117). Sola Akinrinade
and Olukoya Ogen, in their recent study, submitted that "unemployment,
violence, environmental degradation, lack of an enabling social infrastructure,
political repression and extreme poverty" pushed many Nigerians to the
industrialized countries of the West (2010, p. 7).
The settlement pattern in the United States varies widely. The data
published by the Migration Policy Institute (see Table 6) for the year 2000
indicate that New York had the highest number of Africans (116,936 or 13.3%),
followed by California (12.9%), Texas (7.3%), and Maryland (7.1 %). This spread
is different for migrants from different African countries. For example, the
settlement pattern for Nigeria (see other part of Table 6) shows that in 2000 most
Nigerians settled in Texas (20,927 or 15.5%), followed by New York (14.0%),
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Maryland 01.2%), California 00.3%), and Georgia (6.5%). Incidentally, Nigerian
Consulates are in New York City and Atlanta, Georgia, to the displeasure of
Nigerians residing in Texas.
It is not clear why people choose to settle in one state rather than the other.
Climate, especially preference for warm weather, is definitely a factor. Chain
migration is another important factor; the success of many pioneer migrants
typically attracted others from their village, clan, or ethnic group. Another
consideration is potential for success, especially availability of good schools for
career changes and children's education. Other important factors are associated
with the reputation of the region/state of the United States: standard of living, job
and career opportunities, and reputation or openness of the state for diversity.
Table 6: States with the Largest Africa-Born and Nigeria-Born Population in 2000
Africa-Born Number Percent Nigeria-Born Number Percent
United States 881,300 100.0 United States 134,940 100.0
New York 116,936 13.3 Texas 20,927 15.5
California 113,255 12.9 New York 18,889 14.0
Texas 64,470 7.3 Maryland 15,071 11.2
Maryland 62,688 7.1 California 13,939 10.3
New Jersey 59,917 6.8 Georgia 8,740 6.5
Massachusetts 47,770 5.4 New Jersey 8,389 6.2
Virginia 42,509 4.8 Illinois 7,161 5.3
Georgia 40,423 4.6 Florida 3,812 2.8
Florida 34,495 3.9 Massachusetts 3,374 2.5
Minnesota 34,469 3.9 North Carolina 3,123 2.3
Source: Compiled from Migration Policy Institute, Retrieved August 11,2010 from
http://www.migrationinformation.org/da tahub/whosresul ts.cfm
All available evidence suggests that African elite migrants settled quite well
in the United States. At least they achieved career success. Amadu Kaba cites a
2001 U.S. Census Bureau report that "shows that of the 400,000 African
immigrant workers aged 16 and over in the United States in March 2000, 36.5%
were in managerial and professional specialties (compared to 30.9% of native
workers), the highest ranks of job categories in the nation" (Kaba, 2009, p. 116).
This group represents the cream of the crop, the elite of the elites. As will be
shown in the next section, success stories are relative. Career success does not
always translate into quality of life, especially for first generation migrants.
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Commitments and obligations to family and relations back home, addressed
through remittances and other financial transfers, take a decent proportion of
immigrants' household expenditures.
Forming a diaspora requires creating a community, and African migrants in
the United States have done quite well in this regard. Typical evidence of
community includes the following, among others:
• Grocery stores that distribute African foods, restaurants that serve African cuisines,
catering for special events, slaughter slabs for halal meat;
• Diaspora national, ethnic, professional, hometown, alumni, and other associations;
• Tailoring, boutiques, hairdressing, and other beauty salons;
• Communication, news and information dissemination setups like TV/radio stations,
Internet news sites, newspapers, weblogs, and discussion groups;
• Shipping agencies that connect home businesses with the Diaspora;
• Churches (large and small), Islamic jamaa, traditional religious shrines;
• Saturday language schools to teach African children African languages and cultures;
• Art shops, museums, entertainers (musicians, drummers, etc.) for special events
As for success defined in terms of satisfaction, that too is relative. And we
probably need to distinguish between job satisfaction and complete, wholesome
satisfaction-most have the former but not the latter. Whether they are elite or
lower-class, most migrants have experienced moments of emptiness, the feeling
of a void. The New African Diaspora, especially the essays in Part Three of the
book, calls attention to these feelings. These essays deal with the plight of Africa's
migrants, including the following: migrants dealing with a myriad of immigration
laws, ill health and bereavement, and profiling and criminalization of immigrants
(as part of the War on Terror).5 In addition, migrants wrestle with questions of
identity and self esteem, psychological issues, child disobedience or rebellion,
financial pressures, etc.
As a result, and perhaps to seem to fulfill the high expectations of relatives
and friends from the home country (that money abounds on the streets of
America, or that the streets are paved in gold!), a number of migrants turned to
crime. Table 7 shows the number of persons removed from the United States and
deported back to their countries of origin for various offenses from 2000 to 2008.
African deportees represent a very small proportion of the total deported
annually. Looking at the 2008 figures, for example, only about 1,999 of the
5See chapters 6-14.
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358,886 deportees were Africans, but the figures fluctuated annually and, overall,
had been declining: from 2,706 in 2003 to 2,112 in 2007 and to 1,999 in 2008.
However, the news is not so good for Nigeria: 435 of the 1,999 Africans deported
(21.8%) were Nigerians. The number was also much higher in 2003 (640 or
23.7%) and 2004 (557 or 20.9%).6
The Brain Drain Phenomenon
Obviously, one of the major consequences of the creation of the New
African Diaspora is the brain drain. As a term and as an idiomatic expression,
brain drain originated in the 1960s when European professionals emigrated to
the United States in search of better pay. It has been applied to the "departure of
educated or talented persons" from a developing country to the industrialized
nations in search of better pay and better condition of service. In this regard,
brain drain is presented in terms of a loss, a drain, of "skilled intellectual and
technical labor through the movement of such labor to more favorable
geographic, economic, or professional environments" (Answers.com, 2010).
A more technical term is "human capital flight," but the alias has gained
more currency. Obviously, not all migrants fall into this category. Usually, the
discourse on brain drain focuses on highly trained professionals such as doctors,
engineers, university teachers, and strategic professionals such as nurses,
computer scientists, and business managers. These are migrants with the most
significant impact on the home countries. Unlike migration from other regions of
the world, which typically comprises laborers, a significant number of
profeSSionals, "brains," come from Africa. The brain drain discourse does not
include prostitutes, farm workers, and persons engaged in menial labor in the
destination countries, for example. By the same token, the discourse often does
not include the internal diasporas created within Africa by, for example, the
migration of Nigerian or Ghanaian profeSSionals to South Africa. Since they are
within Africa, such migrations have been considered as regional or transnational.
In an earlier paper on the subject, I called attention to the need to rethink
the negative connotation typically attached to migration in general and to brain
drain in particular. History of diasporas has taught us that migrations laid the
foundation for the rise and development of new centers of civilizations and
6The situation has not abated. A slaff of the Consulate General of igeria commented that over 800
cases are in the process of being finalized for deportation over the next few months.
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power. The history of the Middle East and North Africa would be incomplete
without the post-Islamic Arab diasporas created in the seventh through the tenth
centuries. Along the same lines, the history of the United States, Australia, and
Latin America would be incomplete without the European diasporas. Indeed, the
term "diaspora" would probably not have emerged without the spread of the Jews
from Palestine to Europe other parts of the world. Equally important is the role
that the United States, a product of largely European diaspora, has continued to
play in the affairs of Europe. Although the long-term effects of the brain drain on
Africa are still in the future, in the short run, however, there has been a "drain."
The drain can be demonstrated, but the numbers are as unreliable as they
are astonishing. 0 one has accurate records of African migrants in the United
States; not the U.S. government and agencies, and certainly not the respective
African embassies and consulates.7 Instead, scholars draw conclusions from small
samples. Case studies are extrapolated to make generalizations. The following
statistics are adapted from Amadu Kaba's chapter in The New African Diaspora
(Kaba, 2009, pp. 110-115).
• Anver Versi: an estimated 5 million African entrepreneurs and possibly 40% of high-
level managers are living in the Diaspora (2003. p. 11).
• Farah Khan: the number of highly qualified Africans (doctors. university lecturers,
engineers) who left the continent: 1960-1975, 27,000; 1975-1984, 40.000; 1985-1990.
60,000 (2003, p. 1).
• Barry Saulrnan: in 2000, 3.6% of Africans, but 31.4% of Africa's emigrants, had a
tertiary education; by 2005, between 300,000 and 500,000 professionals had left
Africa, including 30,000 doctoral degree holders, averaging $185,000 loss to Africa
per person (2007, pp. 75-114).
• John Logan and Glenn Deane: average educational attainment of African
immigrants (14.0 years) is higher than that of Afro-Caribbeans (12.6 years) and
African Americans (12.4 years) (n.d.).
• Eilish McAuliffe and Malcolm MacLachlan: nearly half of doctors trained to work in
Africa emigrate to the West. Hence, the average doctor-patient ratio in Africa was
much lower than it would have been. The numbers for Africa were 17.1 doctors per
100,000 patients and 89.7 nurses per 100,000 patients while for industrialized
countries the numbers were 303.7 doctors and 723.6 nurses per 100.000 (2005,
pp.231-242).
7 At a reception held in Atlanta for His Excellency the Ambassador of Nigeria to the U.S. on August
14,2010, the Nigerian Consul-General in Atlanta admitted that the Consulate does not have an
accurate number of Nigerians in the country. He however stated that the compilation of the data for
the Southeastern United States is almost completed.
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• Ted Schrecker and Ronald Labonte: because of the brain drain, vacancy rates for
physicians in public health services were 26% in Namibia, 36.3% in Malawi, and
42.6% in Ghana (2004, pp. 409-415).
• Michael Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson: in a 2000 study, tracked by name African-
born physicians and nurses in nine Western countries, including Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States. They found the following (2006):
In all Africa In the West % In Sub-Saharan Africa In the West %
Physicians 280,808 64,941 19 96,405 36,653 28
Nurses 758,698 69,589 8 414,605 53,298 II
A lot more such data can be presented, but the point is already made that
brain drain is bad for Africa's countries and other developing countries. The
challenge is how to stop the hemorrhaging, reverse the trend, and promote not
only the retention of Africa's professionals in Africa but also the development of
a healthy business and technical environment for these professionals to thrive.
This question is addressed in the next section of the paper on brain gain.
The Brain Gain Proposal
The literature on brain gain is wide and varied. Brain gain means different
things to different people in different contexts. To the United States, for instance,
brain gain is what the country gained from immigration of the best talents from
all over the globe. A Brookings Institution study by Darrell West published this
year under the title Brain Gain: Rethinking US Immigration Policy, documents
these gains immigration brought to U.S. society and corporations, and
recommends immigration reform and strategic policy that ensure and enhance
brain gain (2010). A blurb for the book from Jeb Bush, former Governor of
Florida, praises the study as follows: "To deal with our fiscal and debt challenges,
we need higher, sustained economic growth. A key element in a high growth
economic strategy is changing our immigration policies to enhance productivity
and innovation. Brain Gain provides a roadmap to do just that."g
A similar view of brain gain pervades the field of international program
administration, especially international student recruitment and admission by
top U.S. universities. Indeed, several graduate programs in the U.S. would not
survive if the stream of international student enrollment suddenly dries up. This
much was admitted by the Migration Policy Institute in a study conducted by
8 See http://www.brookings.edu/press/Books/201O/braingain.aspx?p= 1.
Akanmu G. Adebayo I71
Jeanne Batalova (2007). The study cites NAFSA: Association of International
Educators' findings and maintains that "foreign students and their dependents
contributed more than 13 billion to the US economy in 2004-2005" (Batalova,
2007) through direct and indirect expenditures on tuition and fees, books,
transportation, accommodation, food, and other incidentals. Despite the anti-
immigration outlook of some states, smart city and municipal governments in the
United States are advised to roll out the welcome mat to attract9 international
students and migrants. This is the context of brain gain in the United States.
On the other hand, this paper is interested in a different kind of brain gain.
Also regarded as "the brain drain hypothesis" by Uwe Hunger, this brain gain is
predicated on the idea that "intellectual and technical elites from the Third
World who emigrated to an industrialized country represent a potential resource
for the socioeconomic development of their home country" (2002, p.l). In other
words, through brain gain the negative effects of brain drain are reversed, rolled
back, and turned into great advantage. Resource loss under brain drain "can be
converted into a long-term resource profit ('brain gain') for the developing
country. Thus, 'brain drain' is not seen as the (dead) end of a negative
development that intensifies the economic and social crises of developing
countries" (Hunger, 2002, p.l).
According to Hunger, brain gain is based on two major theoretical
assumptions, each of which has three dimensions hypotheses. These assumptions
and dimensions are summarized below.
1. Emigrated elites are able to play an important role in the development of
their home country.
a. While the emigration of the brightest brains has a negative impact on
the home country's socio-economic development, the return (or
remigration) of the brightest brains lead to an increase in the human
capital stock [the human capital dimension of brain gain].
b. Well-educated migrants are able to attain high positions and
accumulate capital in industrialized societies, and are able to transfer
financial capital to the home country [the financial capital dimension,
also often considered along with remittances].
9 See a recent article on the impact of immigration on Michigan. Klementina X. Sula, "Brain Gain:
Immigration key to future prosperity," DomeMagazine.com (May 16, 2010), accessed August 12,
2010, http://domemagazine.com/features/covOS10.
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c. Elite migrants have established extensive social and professional
contacts which they are able to make available to the home country
[the social capital dimension].
2. Emigrated elites can be attracted by their home countries and reintegrated
and incorporated into the development process.
a. Although differences in standard of living and quality of life in
developing and industrialized countries may result in pull-and-push
factors, incentives can be developed in the home countries to
encourage return (remigration) by emigrated elites [the
infrastructure- incentive dimensionl.
b. Elite migrants have retained and will continue to maintain contacts
with family and friends [the relational dimensionl.
c. Elite immigrants maintain and expand professional contacts with and
perform consulting works for horne country governments and
businesses as well as international development agencies [the
transnational network dimension] (Hunger, 2002, pp. 2-6).
The above model-two assumptions and six dimensions-help to capture
the main theoretical positions on the brain gain. The assumptions are not all on
the same level; each would find expression at different places and at different
times. Moreover, as a conceptual framework, the model does not explain
everything. It does encapsulate the essence of brain gain and why governments
and international organizations are betting the future of Africa's development on
it. We will not go over all the dimensions here but it is pertinent to discuss one of
these: financial capital.
There is no doubt that African elite migrants have accumulated some wealth
that can be harnessed for economic and social development back home. In an
earlier paper, I have discussed the issue of financial remittances (Adebayo,
2010).10 In its 2005 report entitled Global Development Finance 2005, the World
Bank observed that "workers' remittances provide valuable financial resources to
developing countries, particularly the poorest"" (World Bank, "Globa!," YEAR).
As these remittances continued to trend upward, the Bank launched the African
Diaspora Program in September 2007 focusing on three main areas:
'OThe next few paragraphs come from Akanmu Adebayo, "Brain Drain-Brain Gain: Leveraging the
Nigerian Diaspora for the Revitalization of igerian Higher Education," (paper presented at the
25th Conference of the Association of Vice Chancellors of Nigerian Universities, Osun State
University, Osogbo, April 19-22, 2010).
II "Global World Finance 2005," World Bank, accessed August 16, 2010,
http://www.africaDiaspora.com/2005/events/ag/index.php.
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i. diaspora policy formulation and development;
ii. finance, the leveraging of remittances for development; and
iii. human capital utilization, known as "brain drain-brain gain" programs.
By way of implementing this program in 2008-2009, the World Bank placed
emphasis on three main areas: establishing a strong partnership with the AU on
Diaspora development; working with and supporting governments to enable
them engage with the Diasporas, and directly engaging with Diaspora
organizations and professional networks to implement human capital
development projects. In particular, the World Bank partnered with the AU
through an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant for which it provided
$480,000 to support the AU's Representational Office in the United States to
strengthen its outreach to members of the African Diaspora in the Americas. The
main objective of the World Bank has been, through these initiatives, to enable
the Diasporas to contribute to higher education and health institutions in
Africa-hence "reversing and building on brain-drain constraints to become
brain-gain opportunities" (Auma, 2009). The short Tables 8 through 10 provide a
glimpse into the volume and significance of diaspora remittances to African
countries.
Table 8: Remittances to African Countries in 2005
Countries $ million % ofGDP
Egypt 5,017 5
Morocco 4,589 9
Nigeria 3,329 4
Kenva 524 3
Source: World Bank; Maureen Kimani-Lucas, CAPafrique, October 2007, Retrieved from
http://www.capafrique.org February 22, 2010
Table 9: Remittances to African Countries, 2007
Countries Estimated Amount
Nigeria $3.3 billion
Kenva $1.3 billion
Senegal $0.9 billion
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Table 10: Proportion of Remittances to ODA in Nigeria
Years Amount $ billion Percent ofODA
1995 3.1 80
2007 18.5 750
Source: Taipei Times, January 30,2010, p. 9
Equally, diaspora human and social capitals are, potentially, a major gain to
African countries. Potentially, too, they constitute significant social remittances
from the Diaspora to the home countries. According to Peggy Levitt, there are
three types of social remittances: normative structure, systems of practice, and
social capital. Discussing this further, the North-South Center opined that
"normative structures are ideas, values and beliefs ... systems of practice are the
actions created by normative structures ... and social capital consists of social
networks and associated norms that have an effect on the productivity of a
community" (North-South Center, n.d., pp. 7-8). According to brain drain
theory, elite migrants (doctors, nurses, engineers, university professors, and other
professionals) constitute a loss to the developing countries' human capital stock.
Their return would increase the quality of that human capital stock, thus having a
value-added effect on the economy. In general, also, Africans are a friendly
people; wherever they live, they form connections and networks that could be
tapped as a resource. Normative values are values that immigrants consciously or
unconsciously pick up from their host culture, such as work ethic, friendly
customer service, forward planning, volunteerism, giving, practical application of
knowledge (not just theory), etc. The assumption in brain gain theory is that
through remigration the disapora transfers these networks and values back to the
home country.
The six dimensions are visible in African elite migrants' relationship with
their home countries. However, Asian countries have already shown that
migration, brain drain, remigration, and subsequent brain gain are possible. India
especially provides us examples of how the six dimensions can be combined and
how home country governments can tap into the rich resources of the Diaspora.
According to Hunger, "although it is still a developing country and worldwide
one of the biggest recipients of international development aid, India is one of the
most attractive and dynamic development centers of technology products in the
world" (2002, p. 7). The key growth has been in the software development sector.
Here, Hunger provides a beautiful case study summarized thus:
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On a closer look at the Indian software sector it can be seen, that the key
positions of this line are to a large portion filled by Non- Resident Indians who
left the country and emigrated (mainly to the USA) in the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s (former "brain drain" Indians). Many of these elites returned to their
home country at the beginning of the 1990s after the introduction of the
economic liberalization policy. Based on the arisen economic competitive
advantage in India these elites have helped to build up the Indian software
sector. 10 of the 20 most successful software enterprises in India (which
represent more than 40% of the total turnover of the line) were set up by former
Non-Resident Indians returning from the USA and/or are managed by them.
(Hunger, 2002, p. 10)
Many Asian and Latin American countries, especially India, China,
Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, have experienced postcolonial brain drain a lot
sooner and a lot longer than many African countries. It was these Asian case
studies that convinced the World Bank and IMF (World Bank, 2007), as well as
United Nations, to encourage the mobilization of the Diaspora by African
governments for their economic and political development agendas. There is no
reason to doubt that, like India and China, African countries could also reap the
benefits of brain gain from their vast diasporas. The questions are "when" and
"how?"
Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Recommendations
From serious researchers at the World Bank to casual commentators at the
street corners, everyone wants an immediate answer to the question: When and
how would the brain drain convert to brain gain for affected African countries?
And everyone seems to have answers, even if they were improbable, simplistic, or
romantic. One thing is clear: turning brain drain to brain gain will not be cheap,
but it must be done if desired results were to be obtained. Although many issues
tend to be mixed up in the discourse, there are at least two simultaneous
propositions: the first proposition is that elite migrants should return home to
directly contribute to the development process; the second proposition is that
elite migrants who do not return home should contribute indirectly to the
development of Africa. The first proposition requires remigration while the
second proposition only requires that migrants place their expertise, talents,
experiences, and wealth at the disposal of their home countries. All conversations
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between the Diaspora and the home governments, and all discussions moderated
by the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, USAID, and other agencies
and organizations, have emphasized elements of these two propositions.
Surprisingly, the World Bank has been a good resource in this conversation.
Having seen the results of Diaspora engagements with Asian and Latin American
countries, the World Bank has pushed a similar philosophy and promoted the
mobilization of the African Diaspora for Africa's development. In September
2007, for instance, the Bank developed a "concept note" entitled "Mobilizing the
African Diaspora for Development." Subsequently, the Bank and the AU entered
into a partnership and, in February 2010, the Bank again hosted the Second
African Diaspora Open House in Washington, D.C. This was a high-powered
meeting of some "400 members of the African Diaspora, representatives from 19
countries and 137 associations." The agenda for the meeting was extensive; it
covered such matters as the following:
• Diaspora Engagement Policy: What can governments do to encourage and
facilitate Diaspora participation?
• Remittances: How can remittances be leveraged for development?
• Brain Gain: How can African Diaspora Professional Networks and
organizations contribute to brain gain in home countries?
• Hometown Associations: How can Hometovm Associations' contributions
be mainstreamed with the development priorities of the government?
(World Bank, "Hosts," 2010)
The Open House deliberated on these matters and others, and came up with
several plans and recommendations, including many frank statements about the
need for improved governance, accountability, openness, and inclusiveness.
According to a published report of the discussions,
During the event, participants emphasized the need to devote sustained and
additional resources to improving governance. This included facilitating the
Diaspora's participation in policy making and investment by encouraging
African governments to take advantage of the Diaspora's intellectual and
financial resources as well as members' patriotic motivation. Participants also
raised the need to improve channels for remittances. Remittances should be
linked to financial products and services such as pensions and micro insurance,
they said. Capacity building for women on business development activities was
also recommended. As part of the discussions, strategies to improve health
services based on the MDGs were debated, including strengthening health
systems, and Diaspora engagement through human resources for health,
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including training of doctors and nurses. On education, the group noted that
Diaspora engagement can be catalytic in the transfer of knowledge. Participants
encouraged the Bank to facilitate the process. They also encouraged the
contribution of African Diaspora professional networks and organizations to
brain gain in home countries. (World Bank, "Africans," 2010)
In other words, well-meaning policy makers and patriotic Africans have
pondered the question of turning brain drain into brain gain. The following sets
of recommendations follow from existing research, conference proceedings, and
interviews I conducted.
1. Strengthening Diaspora Networks: Members of the African Diaspora have
established many networks, including professional, ethnic, hometown, and
alumni networks. Experience shows that Diaspora networks need to be
strengthened to promote development. Home country governments need to
establish formal channels of communication and engagement with diaspora
organizations and members. See Figure 4 for a model of Diaspora-Home
Government network and relationship. Until recently, national networks were
rare. But times have changed; national organizations have now emerged of
African diaspora from Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria, to name a few. Like
other African leaders, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria recognized the
need to mobilize the Diaspora for development. In 2002, he stimulated the
formation of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) with large regional
bases in North America and Europe. His administration also created a formal
link to the government by appointing a Special Assistant to the President on
igerians in the Diaspora. Nigerian embassies and consulates were also charged
with continued engagement with the Diaspora and to strengthen these links.
Subsequently, the Obasanjo administration declared July 25 as Nigerian Diaspora
Day. The first was celebrated in 2006. The engagement with the Diaspora also
extended to the inauguration of another initiative, the Nigerian National
Volunteer Service, in 2004 (Ajayi, 2004). While NIDO has made some progress,
its leadership has also been scuttled by irreverent ideological, ethnic, and
personality conf1ictsY
In addition to official, national networks, many members of the Diaspora
have found it profitable to engage in other kinds of linkages. Individually or
collectively, many professors in the Diaspora have worked through their
12 See NIDO Americas website for more information. http://www.nidoamericas.org/.
78 I Journal of Global Initiatives
institutions' international engagement to improve the curriculum, linkages, and
academic conditions of African universities. Many of these activities have been
undertaken along the professors' international teaching, research, and
professional service channels. Examples of such initiatives include book
collection and donation to African universities, summer teaching, collaborative
research and publishing, joint conferences, and international scholar exchanges.
A specific example is the links program between Kennesaw State University
(KSU) and four Nigerian universities, initiated by Akanmu Adebayo while
serving as executive director of KSU's Institute for Global Initiatives in 2003-
2009. Similar individual passion and energy need to be harnessed for national
development.
Home country's
Government
00 HOME GOVERNMENT
~ International Develop-~
O ment & Aid Agencies(
Diaspora Professional, Ethnic,
Religious, Alumni, & Hometown
Organizations
00 -OE
Stat~fRegiollal Fed~ra~iO/Home Country's /'
of DI3spora Organlzahons Embassy & Con- II
sulates II
I
.. I
I I
I I
I "I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I "I I
I I
I I
I
000
DlASPORA
1
Nalional Federation of
Diaspora Organizations
Individual Members of the Diaspora
Figure 4 : A Model of Diaspora-Home Government Network and ReLationship
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2. Providing Enabling Environment for Business and Investment
Opportunities: Although the government is currently the biggest "corporation" in
Africa, ultimately the key to Africa's economic development is the private sector.
African governments should promote the growth of the private sector by
simultaneously providing an enabling environment for its disaporas' investments.
In 2006, for instance, KSU co-organized and co-hosted an international
conference on "The Role of the Kenyan Diaspora in Kenya's Development." Two
Kenyan banks participated in the conference, opening accounts for members of
the Diaspora desiring a Kenyan account into which they may transfer funds for
family and friends and for real estate and other investments. The World Bank
recognizes the need for African Diaspora investments and, in its concept note on
mobilizing African diaspora for Africa's development, recommends that the Bank
and African governments should "increase the quality of design and
implementation of Diaspora-led investment initiatives..." It further provides the
following examples of ways of implementing this:
a. facilitating business and investment promotion networks through
mechanisms for Diaspora and home country partners to access
development funds, e.g., organizing Development Marketplace
competitions;
b. facilitating knowledge exchange between [the World Bank's) Africa
Region (AFR) and the Latin America and Caribbean Region (LAC) on
business development, e.g., renewable energy systems such as bio-fuels
linked to Brazil's expanding business interests in the Southern Africa
region, Caribbean agribusiness export sector practices, and lessons of
[Inter-American Development Bank) IADB and the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) in helping Latin America to
leverage remittances for development;
c. working with the [African Development Bank) AfDB to support a
Diaspora Investment Fund based on global initiatives that exploit the
benefits of Diaspora remittances;
d. engaging Diaspora professionals in the implementation of Bank-assisted
projects;
e. assessing the potential of establishing Diaspora business investment,
management, and service centers in target countries. Currently, the
Diaspora rely on family and friends in business identification and
implementation with varied results as these local actors are untrained;
often funds get diverted and misused;
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f. facilitating a home country banking sector to develop appropriate loan
and credit schemes for Diaspora entrepreneurs; and
g. identifying business development assistance instruments for services to be
rendered to Diaspora entrepreneurs, e.g., business identification,
global/local market survey, preparation of business plan, starting a
business, business capitalization, etc. (World Bank, 2007)
Several other ideas have been proposed in relation to business and
investments. One of them is a proposal that home country governments should
float a Diaspora Bond into which members of the Diaspora and others at home
may contribute.
3. Jobs and Recruitment: Job creation has been recognized as a panacea for
the brain drain. It has the potential of "brain retain" as well as an attractive option
for remigration. African governments will need to work with transnational
businesses, international organizations, and diaspora networks. The kind of job
creation proposed here will, in the words of Philip Emeagwali, require "that we
create one million high-tech jobs in Africa. It requires that we move one million
high-tech jobs from the United States to Africa" (Emeagwali, 2003, pp. 8-10). As
a start, Emeagwali proposes the transfer of call center and customer service/help
desk jobs from the United States to African countries. He further opines that
Africa has competitive advantage over India or China. We know, of course, that
there is more to high-tech jobs than maintenance and customer service. A
concept note developed by the World Bank in 2007 envisaged the creation of jobs
in small business development and in agribusiness, especially "food processing,
packaging, storage, and market-chain extension" (World Bank, 2007). Related to
job creation is recruitment. Home country governments, universities, businesses,
banks, industries, etc. should actively and deliberately recruit qualified and
seasoned members of the Diaspora who are willing to relocate. Many banks and
universities are already doing this. The hiring of such skilled and experienced
technicians and top-level managers should not be left to chance.
4. Infrastructure: One thing is to recruit, but providing an enabling
environment for returnees to succeed is another thing entirely. Of course, there is
a need to close the huge gap that currently exists in standard of living and quality
of life between African countries and Western industrialized countries. Not
everyone in Nigeria would be able to live in posh places such as Victoria Island,
Abuja, and Lekki, but the government can replicate infrastructure in these parts
for the rest of the country. Moreover, those who live in Lekki have to work and
make a living elsewhere. "Home" needs to be attractive enough to spark
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remigration. African elite migrants will need to be assured that their quality of life
would not diminish significantly. Besides these, the infrastructure needs to be
improved across the board to specifically stimulate remigration and also to
forestall continued emigration. Anecdotal evidence indicates that for every one
member of the Diaspora that relocates home, ten or more arrive in the West by
air and boat.
5. Participation in Elections: If their money is important for national
development, then, too, should their votes count in selecting the countries'
leaders, especially the president. Africans in the Diaspora are as passionate about
their home countries' political development, democracy, and stability as they are
about the countries' economic development. They want to be engaged and
involved. At the least, they want to be able to have a say in the election of the
leaders. A few candidates have visited the Diaspora to mobilize fundraising for
their campaigns. However, not many countries have extended the ballot to their
overseas nationals. There are many advantages to this proposal. In the process of
enerating a voters' list, the embassies and consulates would also be able to
improve on the registration of their nationals-a task that many have given up
on. The proposal here is that African countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt,
and Ethiopia should ensure that their large Diasporas are not politically
disenfranchised.
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Table 1: Foreign-Born Population by Country of Birth, 2006-2008
2illl6 2007 2008
Place of Birth
Margin of Margin of Margin of
Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error
Total 37,547,315 +1-125.604 38,059.555 +1-119,486 37,960,773 +1-122,987
Africa 1,375,676 +/·29,935 1.419.317 +1-33.778 1,435,996 +1-31,982
Eastern Africa 360,829 +/-/5,443 386,225 +/-19,357 386,996 +/./5,969
Ethiopia 126.748 +1-10,628 134.547 +1-11,108 137,012 +1-9,845
Kenya 79.111 +1-7.323 80.595 +1-8,259 83.489 +1-7,862
Olher Eastern
Africa 154.970 +1-9.435 171.083 +1-11,864 166,495 +1-9,935
Middle Africa 54,437 +/-6,633 56,056 +/-6,827 55,317 +1-7,/56
Northern Africa 161,469 +/-14,397 174,951 +/-13,416 155,941 +/-13,054
Egypt 136,931 +1-9,603 136.648 +1-9,051 129,970 +1-7,764
Other Nonhem
Africa 124.538 +1-9,846 138.303 +1-9.547 125.972 +1-9,665
SOllthern Africa 81,136 +/-5,113 81,595 +/-6,919 81,698 +/-6,100
South Africa 79.472 +1-5,051 78,571 +1-6.685 79.585 +1-6.200
O'her Southern
Africa 1,764 +1-641 3,024 +/-1.491 2,113 +1-943
Westeru Africa 490,163 +/-16,790 505,619 +/-18,155 535,191 +/-24,209
Ghana 103.051 +1-9,139 104.842 +1-7.842 108.802 .,.1·8.394
liberia 64.100 +1-6.562 72,125 +1-8,397 65.373 +1-6.903
Ni~cria 197,489 +1-11.721 185.787 +1-11.722 206,604 +1-13.728
Other Western
Africa 125,623 +1-8,501 142,865 +1-9.149 154.413 +1-12.580
Africa, not elsewhere
classified 117,441 +/-10,228 114,871 +/-8,118 120,851 +/-8,841
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4,
20 I0, http://www,dhs,gov/ files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.
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Table 2: Persons Naturalized by Country of Origin, 2000-2009
Region and
country of birth 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
REGION
Total 886.026 606.259 572.646 462.435 537.151 604.280 702.589 660.477 1.046.539 743.715
Africa 25.792 24.255 31.489 28.529 34.531 38.830 50,397 41.652 54.420 60.383
COUNTRY
Ni cria 4.128 4,349 6.412 5.691 6,470 6.894 8.652 6.582 8.597 9.298
EthioDia 2.758 2.756 3.892 3.820 4.255 4,621 5.397 5,165 7,160 8,698
Egypt 3,486 3,779 3.698 2.922 3,726 4,061 4.271 3.231 4,165 5,224
Ghana 2.032 1.828 3.326 2,831 3.577 3.561 4.760 3,181 4.557 4,819
Morocco 1.197 1.247 1.274 1.283 1.841 2.628 3.643 2.684 3.383 4.556
Sudan 514 739 1.012 839 1.104 1.551 2.587 2,785 2.893 2,855
Liberia 1,022 778 1.047 917 1.218 1.548 2.193 1,815 2,468 2,767
Kenya 932 731 865 823 997 1.158 1,636 1.396 2.218 2.546
South Africa 1.965 1.468 1,526 1.262 1.453 1.495 2,225 2.069 2,980 2.436
Togo 58 57 113 153 204 291 536 473 673 1,132
I Cameroon 285 299 461 534 575 661 771 611 967 1,098
AI.eria 426 469 615 493 616 722 825 578 894 1,024
Sene.al 218 250 346 274 371 401 503 386 566 640
Cotc d'lvoirc 184 171 271 264 317 324 491 382 479 589
Tanzania 419 333 345 295 348 363 490 356 464 567
U.anda 429 296 321 279 327 340 477 344 541 489
Zimbabwe 274 206 231 210 225 260 322 312 413 489
Zambia 227 158 168 134 180 159 239 212 290 289
libya 181 171 163 112 130 173 142 136 198 249
Mali 48 51 72 64 66 85 118 93 124 149
Angola 113 85 68 64 87 86 106 105 161 95
Niger 554 183 110 46 46 48 46 52 73 67
Mo.t.ambiauc 68 29 57 32 40 50 62 45 73 47
Chad 9 12 3 24 27 19 18 22 22 27
Namibia 13 15 13 13 13 18 17 22 38 27
~ote: Based on N-400 data for persons aged 18 and over.
ource: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4,
2010, http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.
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Table 3: Persons Obtaining Permanent Residence Status by Region and Country of Birth
Region /
country of
binh 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
REGION
841,00 1,058,90 1,059,35 703.54 957.88 1,122,25 1,266,12 1,052,41 1,107,12 1,130,8~
Total 2 2 6 2 3 7 9 5 6
Africa 44.534 53,731 60,101 48,642 66,422 85.098 117.422 94.711 105.915 127.050
COUNTRY
Elhiooia 4.053 5,092 7.565 6,635 8.286 10,571 16.152 12.786 12,917 15,462
Ni eria 7.831 8.253 8,105 7.872 9.374 10,597 13,459 12,448 12,475 15,253
Kenya 2,197 2.501 3.199 3.209 5.335 5.347 8.779 7,030 6,998 9.880
E~ypi 4,450 5.159 4.852 3,348 5.522 7.905 10.500 9.267 8,712 8,844
Ghana 4,339 4,023 4,248 4.410 5,337 6,491 9.367 7,610 8,195 8.401
Sudan 1,531 1,650 2,921 1.883 3,211 5,231 5,504 2,930 3,598 3,577
Cameroon 860 791 984 927 1,309 1,458 2,919 3.392 3.771 3,463
South Africa 2,824 4.090 3.861 2.210 3,370 4.536 3,201 2,988 2.723 3 171
Tanzania 480 476 577 554 747 829 949 832 838 2,773
Sierra Leone 1,585 1.878 2,246 1.492 1.596 2,731 3,572 1.999 2,795 2,687
Cape Verde 1,079 868 871 745 1,015 1,225 1,780 2,048 1,916 2,238
Cote d'ivoire 439 596 629 483 666 930 2.067 1,193 1,645 2,159
To~o 386 487 935 1,187 2,041 1,523 1.720 1,565 1,661 1,680
Sene~al 554 663 530 522 769 913 1.367 1.024 1,149 1,524
Burundi 28 79 120 74 100 186 320 257 255 1,505
AI~cria 906 875 1,030 759 805 1,115 1.300 1,036 1.037 1,485
U~anda 418 457 575 455 721 858 1.372 1,122 1,174 1,364 I
Zimbabwe 322 475 484 358 628 923 1,049 1,057 953 983
Gambia 231 390 343 263 422 581 897 826 739 978
Zambia 211 295 308 280 359 499 672 576 613 704
Mauritania 88 117 124 131 170 275 720 651 844 597
Mali 109 119 105 124 163 277 408 412 523 576
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook ofImmigration Statistics, accessed August 4,
2010, http://WW\v,dhs,gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm,
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Table 4: Nonimmigrant Admissions (1-94 only) by Region and Country of Citizenship, 2000-
2009
Region or
aJUntry of
Qlaenship 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
IlEGION
local 33.660.320 32.8H.088 27.907.139 27.849.4.$] 30.781.330 32.003.435 33.667.328 37.149.651 39.381,928 36.231.554
~o<a 447.131 465.598 387.396 371.799 38....442 395.734 394.163 426.922 474,160 452.693
COUNTRY
SmthAfiica 130.794 129.708 105.054 106.256 111.563 120.522 119.165 12....56-1 123.725 107.238
"':<ria 39.655 48.490 50.750 59.824 61.550 64.697 61.107 69.985 88.732 88.473
E<l~l 60.685 61.854 37.475 31.447 32.164 34.659 38.115 43.139 47.706 49.838
Qana 22.409 24.935 26.023 28.510 29.028 22.988 20.677 20.903 27.125 23.943
.(m"" 18.210 23.755 22.769 18.527 19.636 19,244 19.607 21.H43 23.186 21.443
Eltuooia 9.121 9.369 8.433 9.044 8.189 7.656 9.096 10.964 12,468 12,116
ScnclI.al 14.544 ' ....845 11.349 10.262 9.350 8.235 7.]60 7.696 9,437 9.582
r ameroon 6.325 7.787 8.360 8.194 7.972 7.982 8.558 9.094 9,517 9.329
.T.Ir!lbabwc 10.026 9.394 7.824 7,706 8.026 7.832 7.599 7,831 7.968 7.238
-. 4.284 4.267 4.137 4.091 4.432 4.807 5.206 6.235 6.509 7.147
"-II 4.756 5.737 3.760 3.881 2.609 2.646 3.567 4.055 4.549 4,464
-.:u:d'!voire 5.274 5.457 3.207 2.235 2.444 2.381 3.290 3.001 3.837 4.216
-=. 385 452 347 270 402 757 949 1.680 4.313 3.71 J
~F8SO 1,508 1.657 1.915 1.708 1.760 2.169 2.507 2.674 2.767 2.862
.... l<ooe 2.568 2.762 2.297 2AW 2.594 2.257 2.362 2.630 2.892 2.711
"-boa 3.823 3.178 3.840 3.509 2.854 2.749 1.%9 2.022 2.014 2.394
T.,.. 2.029 2.565 2.341 2.293 2.101 1.779 1.S63 1.689 1.855 1.765
-oen.a 4.7% 3.449 2.312 1.651 1.684 1.4lJ9 1.299 2.228 1.948 1.681
.- 1.620 2,076 6.260 2.890 3.955 4.487 2.781 1,426 1.243 1.380
Clod 515 539 486 398 355 478 532 652 522 541
. ·ote: Admissions represent counts of events, i.e., arrivals, not unique individuals. Admission totals
exceed the number of nonimmigrants admitted. Also, the majority of short-term admissions from
nada and Mexico are excluded.
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook ofImmigration Statistics, accessed August 4,
2010, http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications!yearbook.shtm.
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Figure 1: Source Countries with the Largest Populations in the United States as Percentages of
the Total Foreign-Born Population: 2008
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Source: MPI Data Hub, accessed August 11, 2010,
hUp://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/10.2008.shtml.
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Table 5: Persons Naturalized by World Region, 2000-2009
Region and
Country
of citizenshin 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
REGION
Total 886.026 606,259 572,646 462,435 537,151 604,280 702,589 660,477 1,046,539 743,715
Africa 25,792 24.255 31,489 28,529 34,531 38,830 50,397 41,652 54,420 60,383
Asia 338,532 253,275 238,965 196,972 224,072 243.514 263,516 243,783 330,361 276,375
Eurone 112.616 82,451 86.540 68.902 83.916 91,692 101,068 81,756 108,618 90.149
North America 345,980 200,089 169,548 130,551 151,047 180,572 223,086 241, 163 462,372 250,266
Oceania 2,676 2,585 2,348 2,889 3,551 3,898 3,657 3,342 4,781 3,928
South America 57,807 42,155 42.812 33,635 38,676 44,504 59,985 48,133 84,853 61,674
Unknown 2,623 1,449 944 957 1,358 1.270 880 648 1,134 940
Note: Based on N-400 data for persons aged 18 and over.
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4,
2010, http://www.dhs.govI ftleslstatisticslpublications/yearbook,sh tm,
Table 7: Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Region/Country of Nationality, 2000-2008
Year Criminal Status All African Nigeria Ghana Egypt Kenya Ethiopia South Zimbabwe
Countries Countries Africa
All Removed 188,467 1,593 468 239 102 46 22 40 8
1000 Criminal 73,065 623 277 49 25 17 9 17 D
Non-Criminal 115.402 970 191 190 77 29 13 23 D
All Removed 189,026 1532 421 227 95 50 22 32 19
1001 Criminal 73,545 585 246 48 17 19 13 15 3
Non-Criminal 115,481 947 175 179 78 31 9 22 16
All Removed 165,168 2110 471 213 290 90 31 54 25
1002 Criminal 72,818 697 238 40 70 34 13 15 8
Non-Criminal 92,350 1413 233 173 220 56 18 39 17
All Removed 211,098 2,706 640 306 322 118 77 74 17
1003 Criminal 82,822 886 341 64 52 45 27 27 4
Non-Criminal 128,276 1,820 299 242 270 73 50 47 13
All Removed 24.066 2,662 557 299 256 129 78 72 23
::004 Criminal 91,508 868 284 57 62 49 17 32 II
Non-Criminal 149,157 1,794 273 242 194 80 61 40 12
All Removed 264,431 2,372 480 218 233 117 94 73 34
1005 Criminal 91,725 770 238 76 47 33 19 23 5
Non-Criminal 154,706 1,602 242 142 186 84 75 50 29
All Removed 280,974 2,103 419 187 172 97 105 69 26
1006 Criminal 97,365 705 207 68 33 32 49 26 II
Non-Criminal 183,608 1,398 211 119 139 65 56 43 15
All Removed 319,382 2,112 435 231 145 126 156 45 29
1007 Criminal 99,924 776 235 86 25 33 79 12 D
Non-Criminal 219,458 1,336 200 145 120 93 71 33 D
All Removed 358,886 1,999 435 198 157 135 79 55 36
1008 Criminal 97,133 626 213 55 37 31 34 18 D
Non-Criminal 261,753 1,373 222 145 120 104 45 37 D
0: Data withheld to limit disclosure.
ource: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4,
20 10, http://www.dhs.gov/ftles/statistics/publications/yearbook,shtm,
